Multiple Os

Conceptual engineering is the process of analyzing and improving concepts and their systems to enhance clarity, coherence, and effectiveness in various domains through critical evaluation and modification. Conceptual engineers aim to address problems like ambiguity, inconsistency, and inadequacy, contributing to intellectual progress and improved problem-solving.

Wakil (2021) argues for the need of conceptual engineering for theorizing about female orgasm. While others have called for a need for new models or meta-models, this is the first time I found the explicit recommendation of conceptual engineering in orgasm. I believe this is also the case for male orgasm. As a whole, there have been more attention to female conceptualizations, as many of the people who studied it view it more holistically than the assumed male unitypological, singular experience.

Conceptual engineering includes de novo conceptual engineering (designing a new concept) and conceptual re-engineering (fixing an old concept). Orgasmology is in need of both. Several conceptualizations of orgasm exist, such the life/death conceptualization, a fluid-mechanics-esque models of Eastern Tantra and Taoism, and the Westernized medical conceptualizations of orgasm. Each of these need to be addressed by conceptual engineers to help people make sense of the complexity of both male and female orgasms. Such conceptual models can help future researchers make sense of the interconnectedness of the many facets of orgasm.

Most definitions of female orgasms have one of the following problems: Female orgasm only in intercourse, intercourse = orgasm, conflict/no support sex research, Female response like male’s/ ancestral response dictated by hormones, conflicts with evidence in nonhuman primates, and orgasm = adaptation. There are many other problems, but these are mostly the problems linked to bias in evolutionary science. I agree with all but Wakil’s claim that males cannot have multiple orgasms, like females. This is ironically a result of Wakil’s use of poor conceptual engineering models, like Masters and Johnson’s.

https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-020-02886-8

Awesome Quotations:

“Science is often given a special—privileged—status over other forms of inquiry. Presumably, it is the success of scientific methods which justifies the intellectual authority of the scientific community and supports the claim that science can accurately describe, discover, and underwrite knowledge about the natural world. Many have claimed it is the objective character of scientific reasoning that is responsible for its incomparable epistemic success (Jeffrey 1956; Popper 1959, 1972; Levi 1960; Carnap 1967; Betz 2013). One way of characterizing scientific objectivity is to say that the methods and results are free of any individual or community-wide values, biases, or personal interests. But the fact that scientific research is a human activity threatens to undermine this idea and any associated concept of objectivity. Historical and recent analyses of scientific practice show that contextual values and bias can, and often do, impact both the theoretical and experimental aspects of research” (p. 2315)

“Canvassing the relevant literature immediately reveals the obvious lack of an explicit definition. What exists is a mishmash of physiological, behavioral, and phenomenological descriptors: “the mounting of tension and peak of sexual response.” (Bancroft 1989 p. 81); a “Climax of intense feeling followed by a feeling of relief and relaxation.” (Wallin 1960); “Reflexive clonic contractions of pelvic/abdominal muscle groups.” (Mould 1980); a “Stretch reflex release of genitopelvic muscular vasocongestion” (Sherfey 1973); and my favorite “a capacity to surrender to the flow of biological energy.” (Reich 1973). Despite the staggering multitude of characterizations, I think the various definitions of female orgasm can be taxonomized under two broad categories: classificatory and quantitative. I am borrowing this terminology from Carnap’s classification scheme for the explication of empirical concepts” (p. 2321).